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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
103.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York prohibiting the
maintenance at gas stations of signs larger than twelve inches by twelve inches
"referring directly or indirectly to the price of gasoline." 102 Therefore it was
improper for the Court of Special Sessions to dismiss the complaint upon appeal
from a conviction in the Magistrate's Court. Since the reversal by Special Sessions
10
was upon the facts as well as the law, however, a new trial was ordered. '
Statutory Construction by Unlicensed Driver"

"Knowingly Authorize or Permit Operation of Auto

In People v. Shapiro10 4 the defendant was convicted of a violation of
Section 20(4-a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which provides in part: "Nor
shall any person knowingly authorize or permit the operation or driving of a
motor vehicle owned by him or in his charge upon a public highway of the state
by any person who is not duly licensed." At the trial, a police officer testified that
he had stopped an automobile and found that the operator was unlicensed and
that defendant, who was seated in the front seat, was admittedly the owner. Upon
this factual basis, defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed this
conviction on the ground that there was no proof that defendant authorized or
permitted the operation of his automobile by a person whom he knew to be an
unlicensed driver. On appeal, the People argued that the prosecution was not
required to so prove, since the statute should be construed as imposing a duty
upon the automobile owner to inquire whether a person is licensed to operate a
motor vehicle before permitting him to drive. Rejecting this argument, however,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division for a new
trial.
Since violation of section 20(4-a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law is not
merely a traffic infraction, but a misdemeanor, 10 5 the Court construed the statute
strictly against the party seeking its enforcement.106 Thus the Court concluded
that the word "knowingly" as used in the statute imposes upon the prosecution
the burden of proving knowledge on the part of the accused of facts sufficient to
constitute the crime.'0 7 Knowledge that the operator was not licensed is an
102. PeoDle v. 25 Stations, Inc., 3 N.Y.2d 488, 168 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1957).
103. In People v. Bellows, 281 N.Y. 67, 22 N.E.2d 238 (1939), which was
followed in the present case, it was held, "It is a question of law whether from
any view of the testimony, there was a question of fact regarding the defendants' guilt which should have been submitted to the trial judge or to the jury
and not disposed of by dismissal in the appellate court." Thus review by the
Court of Appeals did not constitute a review of the facts as prohibited by Article VI §7 of the Constitution of the State of New York. But since reversal by
the apellate court below was on the facts as well as well as the law a new trial
was required.
104. 4 N.Y.2d 597, 176 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1958).
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.essential ingredient of this crime and therefore proof that defendant authorized
the operator to drive his car, without more, will not suffice.
Tt'e dissent took issue with the majority on the ground that the legislative
intent would be undermined by placing such a burden on the prosecution since
the aim of the statute is to impose criminal responsibility upon the owner
whenever an unlicensed person operates the motor vehicle with the authorization
of the owner. It argued that the mvjority, in holding it incumbent upon the
People to establish that the owner knew the person he had perm-*tted to operate
his motor vehicle was unlicensed, attributed to the legislature the enactment of a
self-defeating measure.
In the light of traditional interpretation of penal statutes, the majority's
position seems a sound and reasonable expression of the common law maxim that
mens rea is an essential ingredient of a crime.' 08 Unless the legislature expressly
109
provides otherwise, the burden of proof of such intent is on the prosecution.
So-called public welfare offenses have been held punishable without regard to any
mental element, but these have been offenses of a merely regulatory nature,
involving monetary fines rather than imprisonment. 110
Validity of Plea Made on Sunday
Section 5 of the Judiciary Law prohibits, with certain exceptions, the
transacting of any business by the courts on Sunday. The exception upon which the
Reedy"' turned was added by amendment in 1930 and reads:
case of People v,.
"except ...for the receipt by a court of special sessions of a plea of guilty and the
pronouncement of a sentence thereon in any case in which such court has
jurisdiction."
The defendant was arrested on Saturday for driving while intoxicated and
was brought before the court the following day when he pled guilty to the charge
and was fined. On appeal, the Court rejected the contention that section 5 had
been violated. The facts came within the express language of the exception.
Absence of Exit Speed Signs Not Fatal to Conviction for Speeding Where
Reasonable Notice of Speed Limit Given - Per Curiam
A village ordinance proscribed traffic within the village at a speed greater
than twenty-five miles per hour, imposed a fine for violation of the ordinance, and
108.

See People v. D. H. Ahrend Co., 308 N.Y. 112, 123 N.E.2d 799 (1954);

People v. McHugh, 271 App.Div. 135, 63 N.Y.S.2d 319 (3d Dep't 1946); compare

People v. Rosenthal, 197 N.Y. 394, 90 N.E. 991 (1910), aff'd, 226 U.S. 260 (1912).
109. People v. Pieri, 269 N.Y. 315, 199 N.E. 495 (1936).
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See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. RaV. 55 (1933).
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